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Language can impact emotion, even when it makes no reference to emotion states. For
example, reading sentences with positive meanings (“The water park is refreshing on the
hot summer day”) induces patterns of facial feedback congruent with the sentence emo-
tionality (smiling), whereas sentences with negative meanings induce a frown. Moreover,
blocking facial afference with botox selectively slows comprehension of emotional sen-
tences. Therefore, theories of cognition should account for emotion-language interactions
above the level of explicit emotion words, and the role of peripheral feedback in compre-
hension. For this special issue exploring frontiers in the role of the body and environment in
cognition, we propose a theory in which facial feedback provides a context-sensitive con-
straint on the simulation of actions described in language. Paralleling the role of emotions
in real-world behavior, our account proposes that (1) facial expressions accompany sudden
shifts in wellbeing as described in language; (2) facial expressions modulate emotional
action systems during reading; and (3) emotional action systems prepare the reader for an
effective simulation of the ensuing language content.To inform the theory and guide future
research, we outline a framework based on internal models for motor control. To support
the theory, we assemble evidence from diverse areas of research.Taking a functional view
of emotion, we tie the theory to behavioral and neural evidence for a role of facial feedback
in cognition. Our theoretical framework provides a detailed account that can guide future
research on the role of emotional feedback in language processing, and on interactions
of language and emotion. It also highlights the bodily periphery as relevant to theories of
embodied cognition.
Keywords: embodied cognition, language comprehension, simulation, facial feedback, emotion, botox, motor
control, constraint satisfaction
INTRODUCTION
Language can cause powerful and reliable changes in the emo-
tions of readers. A best-selling novel induces similar patterns of
emotions across millions of independent readers. Yet, language is
ambiguous at every level of analysis (Quine, 1960). How, in the
face of this pervasive ambiguity, does language reliably influence
our emotions? Proposed constraints in language understanding
have ranged from innate, universal knowledge structures (Fodor,
1975, 1983) to probabilistic interaction between levels of linguistic
representation (Kintsch, 1988).
For this special issue exploring frontiers in the role of the
body and environment in cognition, we propose an alternative
framework for describing interactions of language and emotion in
which emotion constrains language processing through interac-
tions between central systems for language and emotion process-
ing, and the emotional periphery. In particular, we propose that
facial feedback provides a context-sensitive constraint for guid-
ing simulation of actions described in language. By the periphery,
we mean aspects of the peripheral nervous system most closely
associated with the emotions – the peripheral nerves and mus-
culature of facial expression. The idea of peripheral constraints
in high-level cognition is not new, although early peripheral the-
ories of cognition made only limited progress (e.g., McGuigan,
1966).
Initial support for the account comes from embodied theo-
ries of cognition (Glenberg, 1997; Barsalou, 1999) that propose
overlapping neural systems for processing both emotions and lan-
guage about emotions (e.g., Niedenthal, 2007). The hypothesis
that language about emotions will engage the same neural sys-
tems involved in real-world emotional experience is supported by
research showing that lexical processing on words that directly
name emotions (happy, sad, etc.) can be affected by emotional
states (Niedenthal et al., 1997), and that strongly emotional words
activate central circuitries of emotion (Citron, 2012). However,
because existing theories have focused on language at the lexical
level, they can’t readily explain effects of emotions in language
that doesn’t explicitly describe emotions. While some parts of the
neural systems for emotion and language may overlap, others may
be dissociated, and natural discourse likely includes all possible
combinations. Here we focus only the most difficult case for a the-
ory of language and emotion – the case where genuine emotion
is felt at the periphery even though the driving sentence does not
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contain an emotion word. This approach allows us to account for
findings that are not easily explained by existing accounts of emo-
tion and language, and it generates novel predictions about the
interaction of emotion and language.
Our account differs from previous embodied theories by focus-
ing on how emotion influences language processing above the
lexical level. Rather than proposing a common neural substrate
for emotion and language, we suggest that emotion states influence
the simulation of actions described in language. We articulate this
claim by building on mechanistic theories of motor control and
simulation that explicitly provide a role for peripheral feedback
in ongoing behavior. Doing so allows us to explain evidence that
emotion states impact language that is not explicitly emotional.
Previous accounts are unable to explain such evidence because
they fail to consider how emotion impacts language above the lex-
ical level, and because they rely on the claim about overlapping
neural systems for emotional language and states of emotion.
The account carries three important assumptions about how
emotion interacts with written language (although the account
may also apply to verbal language understanding). All three
assumptions are based on a functional view of emotion (e.g.,
Frijda, 1986, 2007; Levenson, 1994; Keltner and Gross, 1999; Bar-
rett, 2006) that propose emotions produce physical changes in the
body for guiding effective actions in the world. First, facial expres-
sions accompany sudden shifts in wellbeing as described in text,
much as they accompany sudden shifts in wellbeing in real-world
situations. Second, facial expressions modulate emotional action
systems during reading, much as they modulate emotional action
systems in real-world behavior. And third, emotional action sys-
tems prepare the reader for an effective simulation of the ensuing
language content, much as they prepare the organism for effective
real-world actions. In short, peripheral expressions of emotion
constrain language comprehension, just as they constrain effective
actions.
To support the theory, we have organized the paper into two
halves that each focus on one of its main claims. The first half
addresses the claim that the emotional periphery has a functional
role in language comprehension. We draw on research regarding
the role of bodily feedback in language comprehension, evidence
for emotion-language interactions from embodied cognition, and
evidence from facial feedback theories of emotion. We give special
attention to a recent theory of language, the Action-Based Lan-
guage (ABL, Glenberg and Gallese, 2012) theory that provides a
mechanistic framework for describing peripheral-central interac-
tions in language processing. To elaborate the theory, we consider
modifications of the ABL framework that lead to testable pre-
dictions for future study. The second half of the paper addresses
the claim that emotions constrain language comprehension. We
review evidence that emotion constrains action, cognition, and
simulation, and we address the neural systems that are likely
involved in this function. We begin by reviewing the evidence
from embodied theories of language comprehension.
A ROLE OF THE PERIPHERY IN LANGUAGE
EMBODIED THEORIES OF EMOTIONAL LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION
Embodied theories of cognition provide a straightforward expla-
nation for the close link between language and emotion. These
theories suggest that language processing involves a mental simu-
lation grounded in bodily and neural states of action, perception,
and emotion (Glenberg, 1997; Barsalou, 1999; Havas et al., 2007).
By simulation, such theories generally mean a representation of the
situations, objects, or events described in text that is instantiated
in the same neural systems used in original experience. By ground-
ing, it is meant that semantic processing involves modality-specific
symbols, rather than abstract, arbitrary, or amodal symbols as
proposed by classical theories of language (Barsalou, 1999). Thus,
language about action and perception involves the same neural
and bodily systems used in action (Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002;
Hauk et al., 2004) and perception (Pecher et al., 2004; Kaschak
et al., 2005; Tettamanti et al., 2005; Rüschemeyer et al., 2010).
To develop the claim that comprehension of emotional lan-
guage involves emotion simulation, Havas et al. (2007) measured
the time needed to comprehend sentences describing emotionally
laden events when the participant was in a matching or mismatch-
ing emotional state. Sentences, while emotional, made little or no
reference to emotion states. An example pleasant sentence is, “You
and your lover embrace after a long separation.” An unpleasant
sentence is, “The police car pulls up behind you, siren blaring.”
They covertly manipulated emotion using a procedure developed
by Strack et al. (1988) which involves holding a pen in the mouth
to produce either a smile (holding the pen using only the teeth)
or a frown or pout (holding the pen using only the lips and not
the teeth). This procedure has been shown to reliably influence
positive and negative emotional experiences in the absence of con-
scious mediation (Adelman and Zajonc, 1989). They expected an
interaction such that the processing of pleasant sentences would
be faster when the pen is held in the teeth (and participants are
smiling) than when the pen is held in the lips (so that smiling is
prevented), and vice versa for the time to process unpleasant sen-
tences. This is precisely what was found, both when participants
were asked to judge the emotionality of the sentences, and when
they were asked to simply read the sentences.
Why should being in a particular emotional state facilitate
comprehension of the sentence? As suggested above, one possi-
bility is that simulation occurs at the lexical level. Emotion words
might activate central emotion systems that are potentiated by a
matching emotional state (but not by a mismatching emotional
state). This account is consistent with lexical priming theories of
emotion-cognition interactions (Bower, 1981, 1991), in which the
pen manipulation activates an emotion concept (e.g., “happy”),
which then primes words associated with that emotion. Words
that occur in pleasant sentences might elicit more positive emo-
tional activation or less negative emotional activation than words
that occur in unpleasant sentences.
In a subsequent experiment, Havas et al. (2007) used the pen
manipulation in a lexical decision task to test the lexical priming
account of their findings. They used words taken from their stim-
ulus sentences that were rated as being “central to the meaning of
the sentence,” as well as strongly emotional words taken from an
emotion-word database. Although lexical decision times for words
were speeded when preceded by semantically associated words (a
classic priming effect), they were not speeded by the pen manip-
ulation. Thus, a simple mood-priming account based on facial
feedback is unlikely to explain the results.
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Here, we develop an alternative, supra-lexical account of emo-
tion simulation that focuses on the role of the peripheral-central
interactions in grounding emotional language. We propose that
emotion states of the body are called upon in real-time process-
ing of emotional language, and that feedback from these states
helps constrain subsequent simulation of the language content.
Although we agree that modality-specific systems are involved
in language processing, and that partially overlapping neural
systems are involved in both emotional experience and emo-
tional language processing, this account differs from previous
accounts in two ways: first, it provides a framework for examining
emotion-language interactions above the lexical level and second,
it extends emotional grounding beyond central processing systems
to account for influences of the emotional periphery.
Our account begins by integrating evidence for peripheral
influences in language and emotion.
EVIDENCE FROM EMBODIED THEORIES OF COGNITION
How strong is the evidence for a role of the periphery in lan-
guage comprehension? There is evidence from motor cognition
research that peripheral action systems play a part in simulation
(e.g., de Lange et al., 2006), but the equivalency of simulation
in motor imagery and language processing is unclear (Willems
et al., 2009). While embodied theories of language have provided
strong evidence for interactions in the central nervous system
between linguistic and non-linguistic neural processes, evidence
for peripheral influence in language processing is weaker. For
example, Zwaan and Taylor (2006) asked participants to turn a dial
clockwise or counterclockwise as they read through a text. When
the required hand movement conflicted with the action described
in the text (e.g., “turn the volume down low”), the phrase took
longer to read. The authors explain this finding in terms of ideo-
motor theories (e.g., Greenwald, 1970) in which the idea of an
action (reading the sentence) potentiates its execution. Presum-
ably, peripheral activity interacts with simultaneous central motor
planning processes involved in imagining the actions conveyed
by the sentence, although explanations based on central motor
planning processes are also plausible.
A stronger example is based on a study of the impact on per-
ceptual judgments of lifting actions, which are heavily shaped by
proprioceptive feedback (Hamilton et al., 2004). Observers lifted
a weight while they simultaneously judged a weight being lifted
in a video. When the observers’ weight was lighter than that in
the video, they tended to overestimate the observed weight, and
when their weight was heavier, they tended to underestimate the
observed weight. This finding is surprising because it runs counter
to the intuitive prediction that one’s own movements should
prime the interpretations of another’s actions. Instead, the results
demonstrate a repulsion effect where the neural feedback of an
action is dedicated to one task (lifting a weight), it is presum-
ably unavailable for another task (visual judgment of weight), and
this biases the perceptual judgment in a direction away from the
current action.
A similar repulsion effect in language comprehension was
reported by Scorolli et al. (2009). They tested for an impact of
sentence processing on lifting actions. A priming based account
would predict that a sentence describing the lifting of a light
object (e.g., pillow) would prime underestimates of the weight
and result in faster lifting, whereas a sentence describing the lifting
of a heavy object (e.g., tool chest) would prime overestimates of
the weight, and slower lifting. After participants heard a sentence
describing the lifting of a light object, they tended to lift light boxes
slower (as if they overestimated the weight) and heavy boxes faster
(as if underestimating the weight), and vice versa for sentences
describing the lifting of a heavy object. While it’s possible that
the interactions occur solely in central processing, these findings
suggest that simulation in language comprehension is sensitive to
concurrent feedback from the body.
More compelling evidence that peripheral feedback plays a
functional role in language comprehension comes from two stud-
ies using emotional language (Havas et al., 2010). First, elec-
tromyographic recording of facial muscle activity (EMG) during
language comprehension showed that comprehension of emo-
tional language generates corresponding emotional facial expres-
sion. Muscle activity was recorded from the specific facial muscles
for producing angry and sad expressions (corrugator supercilii),
and happy facial expressions (orbicularis oculii, and zygomaticus
majoris) while participants read angry, happy, and sad sentences,
and pressed a button when the sentence had been understood. The
dependent variable of interest was the activity of the three muscle
groups between sentence onset and when participants pressed a
button indicating they had read it. Stimulus sentences made lit-
tle or no reference to emotions or emotion states: an example of a
happy sentence is “The water park is refreshing on the hot summer
day,” a sad example is “You slump in your chair when you realize
that all of the schools rejected you,” and an angry example is “The
pushy telemarketer won’t let you return to dinner.”
As predicted, facial muscles responded in an emotion congru-
ent way to the sentences (see Figure 1). In the corrugator (frown)
muscle, activity was greater for sad and angry, than for happy,
sentences and vice versa in orbicularis and zygomaticus (smiling)
muscles. Moreover, although the average reading times were sev-
eral seconds, the muscular differentiation occurs rapidly – within
1000 ms of sentence onset.
A second, critical experiment asked whether peripheral feed-
back from emotion expression has a functional role in under-
standing emotional language. That is, does peripheral feedback
from the facial expression contribute to language processing? For
the study, first-time cosmetic surgery clinic patients about to
receive botox injections in the corrugator muscle for treatment
of glabellar (frown) lines were recruited. There were two read-
ing sessions, just before botox injection and then 2 weeks after,
wherein participants read the angry, sad, and happy sentences
used in the above EMG experiment. Botox is a highly potent
neurotoxin that causes temporary muscle denervation, and blocks
muscle feedback by preventing release of acetylcholine (ACh) from
presynaptic vesicles at the neuromuscular junction. Botox has also
been shown to affect the intrafusal junction, reducing tonic affer-
ent discharge (Rosales et al., 1996). Muscle relaxant effects result
from the decrease in extrafusal muscle fiber activity and mus-
cle strength within 1–3 days of injection, with peak weakening at
around day 21 (Pestronk et al., 1976). It was predicted that paraly-
sis of the muscle used in expressing emotions of anger and sadness
would selectively affect comprehension of angry and sad, but not
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FIGURE 1 | Facial EMG change in microvolts from baseline (1000 ms
before sentence onset) for emotional sentences across sentence
quarters, and overall (inset; vertical bars represent mean EMG change
during sentence presentation, and horizontal bars indicate significant
comparisons) from Havas et al., 2010. Activity in muscles for frowning
(corrugator) and smiling (orbicularis and zygomaticus) diverges rapidly after
onset of happy, angry, and sad, sentences. The fourth sentence quarter
corresponds to participants’ pressing of a button to indicate they
understood the sentence. Sentence presentation durations have been
standardized.
happy, sentences. As predicted, paralysis of the corrugator muscle
selectively slowed comprehension of angry and sad sentences rel-
ative to pre-injection reading times, but happy sentences weren’t
affected.
This finding provides strong evidence for peripheral emotional
feedback in language comprehension, but it is consistent with two
accounts of emotion simulation. First, botox could have influenced
participants’ mood, perhaps by releasing them from anxiety, and
this change in mood differentially primed the words found in the
emotional sentences. This mood-congruency account is consis-
tent with that of Bower (1981, 1991) and Niedenthal (2007) in
that secondary, central changes in mood state drive the observed
interaction. However, mood measures taken at each reading ses-
sion showed no change in negative affect and a decrease in positive
affect. Thus, the evidence supports a second account: that emo-
tional feedback constrains simulation of the actions and events
described in the language.
EVIDENCE FROM FACIAL FEEDBACK THEORY
Support for this conclusion comes from facial feedback theories
of emotion. Darwin (1872/1998) laid the foundation for research
on the role of feedback in emotion, stating “The free expression by
outward signs of an emotion intensifies it. On the other hand, the
repression, as far as possible, of all outward signs, softens our emo-
tion” (p. 22). William James (1884) directed attention of emotion
researchers to the autonomic nervous system (ANS) and viscera
as a source of emotions, initiating a vigorous debate about the
informational adequacy of the viscera in producing differentiated
emotional feelings. However, James (1884) had intended to include
motor, as well as visceral, feedback in his theory (p. 192). Allport
(1924) carried this idea forward, suggesting that autonomic pat-
terns differentiated only pleasant and unpleasant emotions, but
that the somatic system further distinguished emotions within
each broad class.
Tomkins (1962) and Gellhorn (1964) were the first to empha-
size a crucial role of facial feedback in emotion experience.
Tomkins argued that because the nerves of the face are more
finely differentiated, they provide more rapid and complex feed-
back to central brain mechanisms than do the viscera. He also
noted that facial expressions precede visceral changes during an
emotion episode. Gellhorn (1964) suggested a neurophysiological
route via the hypothalamus by which finely tuned facial feedback
influenced cortical processing of emotion. Izard (1977) further
contextualized the role of facial feedback by describing it as a nec-
essary, but insufficient, component of emotion experience. Still, he
agreed that differentiation in consciousness of emotions depends
on the rapid and specific sensory feedback from the face.
Paul Ekman (1992) updated James’ model of emotion, propos-
ing that emotional situations trigger facial reactions, which then
trigger specific patterns of autonomic response, and the combined
somatic and autonomic patterns constitute emotional states. A
good deal of evidence supports Ekman’s view. First, Robert Leven-
son and colleagues have provided strong evidence that distinct
emotional facial expressions produce differential ANS activity
(Ekman et al., 1983; Levenson et al., 1990; Levenson, 1992). They
used the directed facial action task, in which participants are
instructed to pose their face into a prototypical facial expression.
As a result, the subjects show emotion-specific ANS patterns, and
report experiencing the expressed emotion (Levenson et al., 1990).
In addition, similar facial responses are observed across diverse
cultures (Ekman and Friesen, 1971; Ekman, 1972), suggesting that
facial expressions reflect a universal, functional adaptation.
This function may be inherently social. A proposal from social
cognition research suggests that emotional expressions may trans-
mit automatically across individuals through a mechanism of
“emotional contagion” (Hatfield et al., 1994). Studies have shown
that observing facial expressions automatically activates facial
mimicry in the observer’s expressions (Dimberg, 1982; Hatfield
et al., 1994), even in response to subliminally presented stimuli
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 294 | 4
Havas and Matheson Bodily feedback in emotional language
(Dimberg et al., 2000). Thus, feedback from the mimicry of
another’s emotion expression may produce a similar emotion state
in the observer, allowing for the automatic and implicit conver-
gence of emotions across individuals. Neuroimaging studies show
that areas consistently found to be involved in both observation
and execution of facial expression include emotional processing
regions of the brain, like the amygdala, insula, and cingulate gyrus,
as well as motor areas (Molenberghs et al., 2012). Recent efforts
to focus on the neural correlates of automatic facial mimicry
(as opposed to mere observation) have combined brain imag-
ing with facial EMG. So far, these studies have reliably found
automatic facial mimicry to engage the same emotional brain
networks, including the amygdalar region, insula, and cingulate
cortex (Schilbach et al., 2008; Heller et al., 2011; Likowski et al.,
2012). The relevance of these brain areas to the present theory will
be discussed in greater detail below.
Despite the strong evidence for a causal role of facial expres-
sions in emotional processing, theorists differ as to whether this
relationship is due to facial feedback (Tomkins, 1962; Laird, 1974;
Izard, 1991), or facial efference (motor output). For an instance
of the latter, Ekman (1992) argues for a central, direct connection
between motor cortex and other brain areas involved in coordi-
nating physiological changes. The controversy has persisted mainly
because these two possibilities have been very difficult to separate
experimentally, although progress may be made through methods
that manipulate facial feedback more precisely (i.e., with botox;
Havas et al., 2010). For example, a neuroimaging study showed
that botox-induced paralysis of the corrugator muscle 2 weeks
prior to an facial expression imitation task reduced activation in
neural centers involved in emotion processing (namely, amygdala,
and orbitofrontal cortex), relative to activation in the same sub-
jects before injection (Hennenlotter et al., 2009). In addition, they
found that botox treatment reduced the functional connectivity
of the amygdala with the dorsolateral pons, a brain stem region
implicated in control of autonomic arousal (Critchley et al., 2001).
Results of this type provide convincing evidence for the role for
facial feedback in modulating central circuitries of emotion.
An important recent finding is that facial feedback effects may
be largest during processing of ambiguous emotional stimuli. This
idea echoes those of earlier theorists that assign facial feedback to
tasks involving more finely differentiated emotions (e.g., Allport,
1924; Izard, 1977). Using a quasi-experimental design, Davis et al.
(2010) compared self-reported emotions in subjects who chose
facial botox injections to subjects who chose control injections that
do not paralyze the facial muscles. Subjects rated their reactions to
emotional video clips of varying valence and intensity both before
and after injections, but because injections were administered in
muscles used in both positive and negative emotions, results were
interpreted only in terms of the overall magnitude of emotional
experience rather than the valence. Overall, they found that botox
injections reduced the magnitude of emotional response to the
video clips relative to control injections (of cosmetic filler that
doesn’t affect muscle activity). However, the reduction occurred
only for video clips of mild positive intensity and not for strongly
positive and negative clips. The authors suggest that the emotion-
ality of strongly emotional clips is over-determined by responses
of other, perhaps visceral, emotion systems.
Another recent study demonstrates that manipulation of facial
feedback (both blocking and enhancing) impacts processing of
ambiguous emotional stimuli – in this case, pictures of emotional
faces. On the basis of findings that facial mimicry enhances per-
ception of emotions in the faces of others (Goldman and Sripada,
2005), Neal and Chartrand (2011) asked participants to decode the
expressions in pictures of faces. The facial expression stimuli were
ambiguous in this task because they were completely obscured
except for the region directly surrounding the eyes. In their first
study, they compared the effects in patients with botox injec-
tions in facial muscles to those in a control injection that did not
impact facial feedback. Accuracy in emotion perception was lower
in patients whose facial feedback was blocked. In a second study,
the authors determined that the reverse was also true by ampli-
fying facial feedback using a restricting facial gel that produces
muscle resistance, known to increase proprioceptive feedback.
Performance accuracy in the emotion recognition task increased
relative to control participants, but this difference was absent in
controls tasks that are not supposed to involve facial mimicry.
In sum, the evidence from embodied cognition and from facial
feedback theory suggests a functional role for facial feedback in
emotion processing tasks, and perhaps particularly in tasks that
involve automatic processing of emotionally ambiguous stimuli.
Given this evidence, there are at least two ways in which facial feed-
back might influence a simulation of emotional sentences. First,
facial feedback might contribute to a simulation by generating
activity in modality-specific (i.e., emotional) systems of the brain.
For example, feedback from a frown might potentiate the neural
systems involved in sad or angry moods, and would thus enhance
the recognition of language describing sadness or anger. However,
this account fails to explain the absence of an effect of the pen in
processing individual words from the study of Havas et al. (2007).
Furthermore, this account fails to explain the absence of mood-
congruent changes in the study of Havas et al. (2010). Evidence
that botox injections selectively impact mood in non-clinical sub-
jects is scant1. One study shows that patients who received botox
injections in the frown muscle report normal levels of depression
and anxiety compared to patients receiving other cosmetic surgery
treatments who score in the borderline morbid range on these
measures (Lewis and Bowler, 2009). However, because this study
was correlational in design, participant self-selection cannot be
ruled out. An alternative account that is consistent with the func-
tional view of emotions outlined here is that emotion feedback
allows context-sensitive modulation of perceptions, actions, and
the simulation of actions in language. In this account, facial feed-
back contributes a highly sensitive source of information about the
affective potential of the linguistic context that serves to constrain
action simulation.
To understand how emotional feedback might constrain the
simulation of action, we turn to a language-processing framework
that explicitly provides a role for feedback in language: Glenberg
1Although evidence for mood changes from conscious, self-generated expressions
is stronger (e.g., Duclos and Laird, 2001), these data may not bear on the specific,
unconscious mechanisms we are able to isolate with botox. Furthermore, any mood
changes due to facial feedback may be secondary to the amygdala-mediated changes
that we propose occur in language processing.
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and Gallese’s (2012) Action-based Language theory (ABL). The
ABL theory is based on internal models framework of motor
control in which bodily feedback contributes to the acquisition
and updating of an internal representations for motor control.
Glenberg and Gallese show how the framework (and periph-
eral feedback) can be applied to language, and they provide an
explicit definition of simulation in language comprehension. After
describing this work, we propose a modification of the ABL model
for emotional language comprehension. By building on the ABL
model, we aim to firmly ground our account in theories of action
and to be explicit in our assumptions.
THE INTERNAL MODELS FRAMEWORK
Computational approaches to motor control propose that the
brain uses internal model for the control of behavior (Wolpert
et al., 2001, 2003). Forward models (or, predictors) provide a
model of the relation between a motor command and the sen-
sory (vision, proprioception, touch, etc.) consequences of that
movement. The function of a predictor is to predict these sen-
sory consequences so that, given a particular motor command, the
sensory outcome can be anticipated. A predictor might model, for
example, the sensory consequences of lifting a cup to drink (that
it will be heavy with water).
On the other hand, inverse models (or, controllers) do the
inverse – they compute the context-sensitive motor commands
necessary to accomplish a particular goal. A controller might
model, for instance, the trajectory, and velocity of arm movements
needed to lift a cup to drink. A biologically plausible account of
how controllers are formed is through feedback error learning
(Kawato, 1990, 1999). FEL uses performance error, or the differ-
ence between the desired and actual trajectory, for learning how to
control movements. Much like the cruise control in a car, a con-
troller monitors sensory feedback and continually adjusts motor
output in order to maintain the desired outcome. Through this
feedback error computation, the controller learns a functional
mapping from motor commands to goal-based actions.
For control of simple actions like reaching for a cup, multi-
ple predictor-controller pairs, or modules, are used (see Figure 2;
Wolpert and Kawato, 1998; Wolpert et al., 2003). But even simple
actions are ambiguous. For example, lifting a cup when it is full
has different dynamics than when the cup is empty, so different
modules will be needed for each contingency and several modules
may initially become activated2. The actual motor command is a
weighted function of the outputs from the active controllers where
the weighting of each controller is determined by two factors:
the prior probabilities that each module is actually appropriate
for the current context (the object affords action; Gibson, 1979),
and the posterior probability, which is determined by prediction
error. For example, if the selected module was not correct, then the
2Although modules are unnecessary in dynamical systems approaches to motor
control (e.g., Churchland et al., 2012), Wolpert and Kawato (1998) discuss several
advantages to using a modular approach. One important advantage for present con-
sideration is that language is modular, or conveyed by discrete units in the form of
phonemes or words. Productivity in language is accomplished by combining these
discrete units, from different levels, in novel ways (Hockett, 1960), much as Wolpert
and Kawato propose for the production of novel movements.
FIGURE 2 | A simplified internal models framework based on Glenberg
and Gallese’s (2012) ABL model. Here, we add a signal for learning to
predict the reward of actions. Multiple modules, composed of paired
predictors and controllers, anticipate the sensory and affective
consequences of actions. Prediction error, derived from the actual sensory
and affective consequences, drives learning in the controller and adjusts
the responsibility for a particular module. As in Glenberg and Gallese’s
model, actual motor output is a weighted function of modules, higher-level
modules provide hierarchical control of goal-based actions in the form of
prior probabilities that influence lower-level module selection, and a gain
controller is added for simulation in language comprehension.
prediction error will be large and this will decrease the module’s
responsibility weighting. Thus, bodily feedback provides an ongo-
ing signal for deriving contextually appropriate actions in real-
time motor control. Bodily feedback be particularly important
when dealing with novel contexts. Recent evidence suggests that
feedback gains are increased during early stages of learning when
the appropriate controller is ambiguous (Franklin et al., 2012).
For goal-based actions, Wolpert and colleagues (Haruno et al.,
2001) have proposed that higher-level modules for goal-based
action (say, drinking) learn to coordinate a sequence of lower-
level actions, like reaching to grasp, lifting a cup, and taking a
drink. The higher-level controller generates prior probabilities that
lower-level modules are needed, while the higher-level predictor
predicts the posterior probabilities that lower-level modules are
accurate. This hierarchical organization reflects the neural archi-
tecture of the motor control system where at higher cortical levels
the motor system is organized into actions rather than individ-
ual movements (e.g., Umilta et al., 2008). This feature allows the
motor system to create combinations of elementary units that
are contextually appropriate, or that satisfy multiple simultane-
ous constraints. It has been noted that both language and motor
control share this quality (McClelland et al., 1988).
THE ACTION-BASED LANGUAGE THEORY
In their ABL theory, Glenberg and Gallese (2012) propose that
the same solution used in motor control was exploited through
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 294 | 6
Havas and Matheson Bodily feedback in emotional language
evolution by language. They link language and action through the
neural overlap between the mirror neuron system for action and
Broca’s area in the inferior frontal cortex (IFG) for speech artic-
ulation (see also Fadiga et al., 2006). The mirror neuron system
encodes motor intentions (either observed or executed), includ-
ing the motor intentions behind heard or observed speech acts.
Because in human development, motor actions often co-occur
with speech (e.g., a parent might say the word for an action while
they demonstrate that action to a child) speech articulation primes
motor action, and vice versa, through associative Hebbian learn-
ing. For example, the module for articulating a word like “drink”
is associated through social development with the module for the
motor actions involved in drinking. Likewise, language about a
“girl”activates the module used to predict the sensory consequence
of moving the eyes to see a girl illustrated in a children’s book.
For their model of language comprehension, Glenberg and
Gallese add a gain control for the gating of sensory feedback, and
for inhibiting motor output in “offline” simulation, imagery, plan-
ning, practice, and language (see Figure 2). For example, if the
gain is set to inhibit motor output, but the predictor is free to make
sensory predictions, then the output resembles mental imagery3.
As Glenberg and Gallese illustrate, the ABL model gives an
account of simulation in comprehending a sentence like, “The
girl takes the cup from the boy.” First, motor output gain is set
low to avoid literally acting out the actions described in the lan-
guage. Upon hearing words for objects or individuals (e.g., “The
girl”), speech action controllers are activated, which in turn acti-
vate the associated action controllers for interacting with those
objects or individuals. Output from the controller produces a pre-
diction of the sensory consequences of such interaction, akin to
mental imagery of the objects or individuals. Upon hearing verbs
(e.g.,“takes”), speech controllers pass activation to multiple possi-
ble action controllers that could fulfill the goal of the action (e.g.,
reach to grab, and the controller is selected according to the prior
probability that it can fulfill the goal. After processing an image of
“the cup,”selection of the next controller is weighted by prior prob-
abilities for the objects of such actions (e.g.,“from the boy” affords
receiving a cup, whereas “from the tree” does not). Importantly,
the prior probability assigned to each action controller depends
in part on the action’s affordances (Gibson, 1979) for fulfilling the
higher-level goal conveyed by the language (to drink). As Glenberg
and Gallese put it,“comprehension is the process of fitting together
actions suggested by the linguistic symbols so that those actions
accomplish a higher-level goal . . .” (Glenberg and Gallese, 2012, p.
12–13). If goal-based actions can’t readily be integrated (“The girl
takes the cup from the tree”), then comprehension is challenged.
INTERNAL MODELS FOR EMOTIONAL LANGUAGE
Although not addressed by Glenberg and Gallese, we believe the
internal models account of comprehension carries an important
additional implication regarding cases where comprehension is
3In most cases, the gain control inhibits most movement, but some movement may
not be completely inhibited, as seen in gesture that accompanies speech. Gesture
research has shown that tasks that involve more strongly simulated actions are more
likely to evoke speech-accompanying gestures (Hostetter and Alibali, 2008, 2010),
even when communicative demands are held constant across tasks.
challenged, or in the language of the framework, where there
is a failure to select modules that fulfill the higher-level goal of
the language. Such cases should result in performance error and
a consequent adjustment in controller output. In online motor
control, feedback from such controller output provides contex-
tual information for adjusting the unfolding action. In online
language understanding, controller output could serve a similar
function for guiding an unfolding simulation. Context should
be particularly useful when the actions needed to simulate the
meaning of the sentence are ambiguous, or underspecified in the
language. Context, which we take here to mean the current state of
body-world interactions (or affordances), helps to guide the selec-
tion of an appropriate controller. Thus, the model suggests that
language will call on the body when comprehension is challenged
by underspecified affordances for action-object integration.
This implication suggests a way that emotions interact in
language. The following proposal rests on the assumption that
emotions accompany a sudden change in wellbeing relative to the
current state, and that they automatically lead to actions that can
capitalize upon, or mitigate, that change (see also Frijda, 1986,
2007). To illustrate this assumption, imagine encountering a bear
while walking in the woods. The experience would automatically
engage modality-specific neural systems, including emotion sys-
tems that motivate actions. Quickly, both the body and brain
would be reconfigured for taking adaptive actions. And because the
body has changed, the affordances of the situation have changed:
a walking stick in your hand may now be readily perceived as a
potential weapon for defense. As this scenario illustrates, the most
effective action in an emotional situation is determined by the
combination of changes in bodily preparation for action, and the
affordances provided in the environment. The neurophysiological
bases for such changes are discussed in the following sections.
In understanding a sentence, affordances for effective action
must be provided by the language. We propose that language that
describes a change in the state of wellbeing that invites but under-
specifies effective action will make module-selection difficult, and
this will lead to an increase in motor output in the form of facial
patterns that reflect an estimate of the affective change described
in the language (e.g., improvement or decline is reflected by a
smile or a frown, respectively)4. For example, a reader can only
infer the most effective actions when understanding the meaning
of a sentence like “The water park is refreshing on the hot sum-
mer day.” Effective actions might include wading, and splashing in
the water – actions that would allow someone to capitalize on the
potential for relief from heat, as implied by the sentence. Because
understanding the language requires that the reader infer these
actions (they are not made explicit in the language), the result will
be facial afference in the form of a smile. By extension, language
that describes a shift in the state of wellbeing in which effective
action is over-determined may not elicit facial efference. The effec-
tive actions in the sentence,“You slam on the brake and curse when
a driver cuts you off,” are already well specified. Although the lan-
guage is emotional in both cases, we hypothesize that the former
sentence should lead to greater facial efference than the latter.
4Because facial muscles produce tonic afferent discharge, a decrease in facial muscle
output would be informative for module-selection as well.
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Although our account is speculative, the previous sections have
reviewed a wide range of evidence for a key feature of the theory –
a role for the emotional periphery in language comprehension.
The following sections review a wide range of support for a sec-
ond key feature of the theory – that emotion constrains language
comprehension. To bolster the claim, we first show how emotion
constrains action, cognition, and simulation. We then address the
neural bases for emotion constraints in language comprehension
before we consider additional features of the theory.
EMOTION CONSTRAINS LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION
EMOTION CONSTRAINS ACTION
Most likely, emotions evolved to prepare organisms for effective
actions. When we are angry, our fists clench, our heart rate is
increased, and we are prepared for aggressive or defensive actions.
When sad, our posture deflates, our heart rate decreases, and we
experience loss of energy. In short, our emotions constrain our
future possibilities for action.
Early emotion theorists recognized that different emotions cor-
relate with distinct changes in the body. Following James (1884)
infamous emotional feedback theory in which he equated bod-
ily feedback with the subjective experience of emotion, appraisal
theorists (e.g., Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986, 2007) proposed implicit
cognitive processes that mediate an emotional stimulus and bod-
ily response. On the other hand, strong theoretical arguments
(Zajonc, 1980; Murphy and Zajonc, 1993) and neuroscientific
evidence suggest that emotional situations can organize action
systems directly without any intervening cognitive processing.
Working in rats, LeDoux (1996, 2002) identified the amyg-
dala as a critical structure in mediating fear learning. The central
nucleus of the amygdala initiates fear responses, including freez-
ing, escape, and autonomic changes, and the basal nucleus projects
to motor circuits in the ventral striatum where information about
an aversive stimulus contributes to action selection (Alexander and
Crutcher, 1990). Because the pathway from thalamus to the amyg-
dala bypasses the cortex and is thus more direct than the cortical
route, it provides a neural mechanism by which emotional situa-
tions directly influence emotional behaviors, bypassing cognitive
processes.
Regardless of whether amygdala activation from emotional
stimuli arises in humans via direct or indirect pathways (for debate
on this question, see Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010; Cauchoix and
Crouzet, 2013), the critical finding for the present purpose is
that activity in the amygdala appears to correspond to changes
in the current state of wellbeing. In monkeys, the amygdala has
been shown to be highly sensitive to the value of a reward rela-
tive to the current state of the body (Paton et al., 2006; Belova
et al., 2007, 2008). In humans, a similar mechanism has been
demonstrated with a procedure called backwards-masking, where
an emotionally arousing stimulus is presented very briefly and
is then followed by a neutral stimulus that blocks the emotional
stimulus from entering consciousness. Such unconsciously pre-
sented fearful stimuli have been shown to cause increases in skin
conductance and heart rate that reflect autonomic arousal (Esteves
et al., 1994). The specific brain changes that occur during uncon-
scious emotion processing have been examined by combining the
backwards-masking procedure with fMRI. When participants in
an fMRI scanner are presented with pictures of either fearful or
happy faces for a subliminal duration, followed by neutral faces, the
subliminally perceived emotional faces cause differential activity in
the amygdala (Whalen et al., 1998). Fearful masked faces increased
amygdala activity, whereas the happy faces decreased amygdala
activity. Thus, cross-species evidence indicates that emotional
stimuli organize action system immediately, sometimes uncon-
sciously, to fulfill the goals at hand. Action is central in emotion
in part because emotional responses are implemented in the form
of action tendencies, or bodily responses that potentiate adaptive
actions. That is, emotions constrain bodily actions.
There is evidence that the amygdala also responds to changes in
wellbeing that are signaled by symbolic or linguistic stimuli. Phelps
et al. (2001) told participants that they might receive an electric
shock to the wrist paired with one stimulus (a blue square), but
that another stimulus (a yellow square) signaled that no shock
would occur. Using fMRI, they found that presentations of the
symbol connoting threat preceded activation of the left amygdala,
which correlated with the physiological expression of fear learn-
ing. They also found a correlation between the expression of fear
and activity in the left insula, an area involved in cortically rep-
resenting the affective state of the body. This suggests that the
left amygdala is involved in the expression of fears and associated
bodily states that are imagined through the use of symbols. Amyg-
dala activation has consistently been observed in response to the
presentation of emotional words (reviewed in Citron, 2012), and
during reading of emotionally intense narratives (Wallentin et al.,
2011).
Based on this association with emotional language comprehen-
sion in humans, we propose that the amygdala encodes changes in
wellbeing described in language. For example, amygdala responses
to reading about a sudden improvement in outlook (“Incredibly,
the numbers drawn all match those on the ticket in your hand”)
marshal autonomic (perhaps parasympathetic) resources involved
in joy, whereas amygdala responses to reading about a sudden
decline in wellbeing (“Your grandmother had a stroke and is in
critical condition”) elicits other, perhaps sympathetic, changes in
the ANS). These autonomic modulations serve to constrain the
possibilities for action, and thus constrain the possibilities for
action simulation.
A defining feature of emotions is that their effects are often sys-
tematic, phasically influencing a range of actions in a hierarchical
manner (Panksepp, 1998). The ANS regulates cardiovascular, gas-
trointestinal, electrodermal, respiratory, endocrine, and exocrine
organs in support of action responses to challenge and oppor-
tunity (Levenson, 1992, 2003). Several theorists have proposed
that emotions are organized at higher functional levels, constitut-
ing two basic motivational circuits (Lang et al., 1990; Davidson,
1992; Gray, 1994). For example, Lang and Bradley have proposed
that emotions are organized around two motivational systems,
appetitive and defensive, mediated by distinct systems at corti-
cal and limbic levels (Lang et al., 1990; Bradley et al., 2001). In
terms of actions, this division translates roughly into behaviors of
approach and withdrawal, respectively, where appetitive activation
generally leads to approach behaviors, and defensive activation
generally leads to withdrawal behaviors (Davidson, 1992, 1995,
1998).
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An important consequence to this hierarchical organization
is that emotions constrain actions in a probabilistic, rather than
deterministic, manner. Top-down emotional constraints on action
will be modified by bottom-up constraints of the environment.
Thus, emotion states don’t correspond to specific actions, but
rather something much like action tendencies, so that the same
emotion state may lead to categorically related but unique actions
depending on the particular context. For instance, at the highest
level of organization, motivational engagement of the defensive
system may prompt different emotion states like fear or anger,
depending on whether the situation calls for flight or fight (Lang
et al., 1990). And at a lower-level of emotional action, anger may
or may not lead to striking out, depending on whether the con-
frontation escalates or is averted. Thus, effective actions are jointly
influenced by underlying emotion states and the sensorimotor
affordances that arise in the situation (Gibson, 1979). In our for-
mulation, these joint functions are served by the global autonomic
changes elicited by the face, and the simulation of action as guided
by the language. Next,we discuss evidence and theory that emotion
is capable of constraining cognition.
EMOTION CONSTRAINS COGNITION
Several theorists have proposed that emotion systems help guide
cognitive processes (Pribram, 1969; Nauta, 1971; Damasio, 1994).
Here we only briefly discuss one kind of cognition: decision-
making. Damasio and colleagues observed that patients with
lesions in the prefrontal cortex (ventromedial prefrontal cortex,
VMPFC) were severely impaired in personal and social decision-
making,and in particular have difficulty in anticipating future pos-
itive and negative consequences of their actions, in spite of other-
wise preserved intellectual abilities, including language (Damasio,
1979, 1994). Their decision-making is often slow and error prone,
and sometimes random and impulsive. However, immediately
available rewards and punishments do influence their behavior.
Whereas most people show increased skin conductance (a mea-
sure of autonomic arousal) in anticipation of a risky choice, even
before they explicitly know the choice is risky, VMPFC patients
do not.
To account for the pattern of deficits, Damasio et al. (1991),
Damasio (1994) proposed a somatic marker hypothesis in which
the components of a complex experience are recorded in modality-
specific neural systems, and these records become associated with
the emotional response that occurred during the experience. The
VMPFC is responsible for learning the associations between a
complex situation (e.g., walking in the woods and encountering
a bear) with the accompanying emotion state (e.g., fear), and for
reactivating the emotion state when components of the original
experience are later encountered (e.g., seeing the walking stick by
the door might reactivate feelings of fear). This function is valuable
in that it provides an implicit emotional “marker” which signals
the value of each decision before action is taken. Emotion reacti-
vation can occur via a “body-loop,” whereupon the viscera actually
change and the ensuing changes are relayed to somatosensory cor-
tices, including the insula. Or, emotional changes can occur via an
“as-if-body-loop” where signals are conveyed directly to the cor-
tex, bypassing the physiological changes. Together, the insula and
anterior cingulate gyrus may be important in integrating cortically
mediated cognitive functions with somatosensory and autonomic
changes (see also Medford and Critchley, 2010).
When do decisions engage the “body-loop” or “as-if-body-
loop”? Bechara and Damasio (2005) suggest the “body-loop”
becomes increasingly important under circumstances of uncer-
tainty or ambiguity. For example, normal subjects generate little
skin conductance responses during tasks that involve decision-
making under relative certainty, compared to tasks involving
decision-making under ambiguity. It is intriguing to note the
parallel with the internal models framework in which peripheral
feedback is particularly important during learning of tasks with
novel (ambiguous) dynamics.
By providing a representation of “what it feels like” to be in a
particular situation, a somatosensory pattern in the insula may be
particularly important in constraining a simulation of actions.
First, through strong projections to the amygdala, the insula
can modulate actions by influencing ANS changes. Second, the
emotional somatosensory pattern helps to constrain the process
of reasoning over multiple options and future outcomes by mark-
ing the sensory components, which describe a related scenario of
future outcome, as good or bad. Somatic states influence cogni-
tive processing by acting as a biasing signal, and can be used to
rapidly accept or reject certain option-outcome pairs. Without
this function, the decision process would depend entirely on logic
operations over many option-outcome pairs, which is slower and
may fail to account for previous experience – just the pattern of
behavior seen in VMPFC damaged patients.
Damasio (1994) proposes that emotional representations for
use in social communication have their own distinct structure, the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), stemming from observations of
patients with damage in this area. Whereas damage to the face
area of the motor cortex will impact the ability to voluntarily
make a smile, it spares the ability to make a genuine, spontaneous
smile. Conversely, emotion-related movements originate in the
ACC, and patients with damage to this area show abnormal spon-
taneous facial expressions of emotion, but normal voluntary facial
movement.
Damasio’s proposed mechanism by which somatic state repre-
sentations influence cognition is through the activation of neuro-
modulator nuclei that project to cortical networks. Bechara and
Damasio (2005) hypothesize that the biasing action of somatic
states on response selection is mediated by the release of the
major neurotransmitter systems, dopamine (DA), serotonin (5-
HT), noradrenalin (NA), and ACh whose nuclei are located in
the brainstem. Changes in neurotransmitter release induced by
somatic state signals modulate the synaptic activities of cortical
neurons subserving behavior and cognition, thereby providing a
mechanism for somatic states to exert a biasing effect on cognition.
In their account, these two neural systems of emotion (neuromod-
ulation and somatic markers) interact to provide predictions about
“what it feels like” to engage in particular actions. Ascending neu-
romodulators facilitate computation of future rewards given the
current state of the body, thereby constraining action selection in
frontal cortices.
Although the somatic marker hypothesis has provided evidence
for a constraining role of emotion in one kind of cognitive task
that involves simulation (of future rewards in decision-making),
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additional evidence comes from tasks that more closely resemble
language comprehension.
EMOTION CONSTRAINS SIMULATION
In the view we are presenting, emotional language calls upon emo-
tion systems of the body that constrain a simulation of actions
and events described by the text. Our view differs from other
simulation accounts in that emotion simulation occurs even in
the absence of explicit affective information like emotional words.
That is, we assume readers will use their own emotional knowledge
to make inferences based on described actions or events that are
not explicitly emotional. Thus, readers bring to bear two sources
of information in understanding language: external information
provided by actions in the language, and internal information
provided by an emotional inference mechanism.
This feature of our theory bears a resemblance to theories
from several other areas of research, which we briefly mention
here. First, discourse comprehension research shows that read-
ers readily bring their knowledge of emotions to make infer-
ences about story characters’ emotions (Gernsbacher and Robert-
son, 1992; Gernsbacher et al., 1992, 1998; Haenggi et al., 1993).
Moreover, readers make such emotional inferences just as read-
ily in the absence of explicit emotional information, simply from
descriptions of story characters’ actions, as they are when emo-
tional information is present (deVega et al., 1996; Gygax et al.,
2007). Thus, our theory is congruent with research from discourse
comprehension.
An important claim of our view is that readers’ emotions serve
to constrain interpretation of the language. This idea can be traced
back at least to “reader’s response” literary theorists who argued
that the reader’s personal experiences provide the basis for textual
understanding (Iser,1978). Some empirical support for this notion
is provided by theorists of literary appreciation (Miall, 1988, 1995;
Miall and Kuiken, 1994) who argued that emotions play a primary
role in appreciating literary stories. In one study (Miall, 1988), par-
ticipants read short stories phrase-by-phrase while reading times
were collected. Afterward, participants rated each phrase for its
emotional significance (“Is feeling significant to this phrase?”),
and correlations between reading times and affective ratings were
measured. There was a positive correlation in the early part of the
stories where readers are presumably using affect to guide a search
after meaning. Correlations became negative later in the story,
presumably because affect is now confirming the interpretations
set up in the early part. Citing Damasio’s patients with VMPFC
damage who are unable to select among possible response options,
Miall (1995) speculates that in reading literature, this deficit might
present as a failure to decide among possible inferences about a
sentence in a story. However, because the methods used by liter-
ary theorists often focus on post-comprehension processes, they
can’t speak to how emotional states are generated to begin with. As
described above, our view is that facial expressions are generated
at points of ambiguity.
Our theory also bears a resemblance to social cognition research
into “mentalizing,” or the ability to explain and predict behavior
of others in terms of one’s own mental or emotional states (Frith
et al., 1991) and empathy, or the ability to share the feelings of oth-
ers (Decety and Lamm, 2006). Because the mental states of others
are not directly observable, they must be inferred solely on the
basis of overt behaviors, or abstract (i.e., verbal) descriptions of
those behaviors. Whereas emotional decision-making is associated
with the VMPFC, mentalizing from verbal material (i.e., inferring
the likely goals, intentions, and desires of people described in sto-
ries) reliably engages more dorsal regions of the medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC and the ACC), as reported in a large meta-analysis
of neuroimaging studies (Van Overwalle, 2009). Just as somatic
state representations in the insular cortex are well suited, both
functionally and anatomically, to contribute to decision-making,
they may serve to constrain the processes that take place in the
MPFC (Augustine, 1996). Functionally, anticipated somatosen-
sory states would provide an experiential basis for predicting the
future behavior of others, in much the same way as they help guide
one’s own subsequent behaviors.
Other research has shown that somatic state representations
in the insula might provide a basis for empathy. Neuroimaging
studies have shown that the same regions of the insula are active
both during experience of aversive events, such as disgust (Wicker
et al., 2003) and pain (Singer et al., 2004), and during the obser-
vation of those states in others. Overlapping activity in the insula
across these divergent modes of experience is thought to indicate
a neural mechanism for emotional understanding, and provides
initial support for somatic state representations in inferring others’
emotions (Wicker et al., 2003).
NEURAL BASES OF EMOTION CONSTRAINTS IN LANGUAGE
In previous sections, we have mentioned the neural circuits
involved in some aspects of our theory. Here, we address two
remaining questions. First, how are facial responses elicited by
neural processing of sentences? While this question is unexplored
in the neuroscientific literature, we propose that facial responses
arise in response to sentences that convey a sudden change in
wellbeing relative to the current state of the body, and under-
specify the appropriate course of action, driving emotional action
inferences. Such sentences may produce a state of cognitive con-
flict about which actions are appropriate for fulfilling the goals in
the language. Take the sad sentence (written by an undergraduate
research assistant for our EMG and botox studies), “You slump
in your chair when you realize all the schools rejected you.” For
the present purpose, we can consider the higher-level goal of the
sentence to be a simulation of the dejection, anguish, and exas-
peration (and the correlated actions) associated with social and
vocational disappointment. Simulating the initial action of the
sentence (slumping) will generate a modality-specific prediction
of the sensorimotor consequences of the action, including a pre-
diction of withdrawal, or perhaps pain (MacDonald and Leary,
2005), in somatic cortices. But because the reader’s actual current
somatic state (alertness and engagement as required by the read-
ing task) conflicts with the somatic prediction, a large prediction
error will result, forcing a shift in action controllers to simulate
the higher-level goal of the sentence. However, effective actions
are not specified in the remainder of the sentence, and so the
ensuing simulation is faced with a conflict. Here, we propose that
a facial expression will be triggered that reflects the direction of the
somatic prediction error (a frown). The resulting context-sensitive
facial feedback will modulate the emotional state of the body (as
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described above), and update the somatic state representation for
use in simulation5.
We consider the cingulate cortex a likely substrate for mediating
facial efference because it is strongly associated with task perfor-
mance under cognitive conflict (Botvinick et al., 2004), is proposed
to underlie the integration of cognitive and emotional processes
(Bush et al., 2000), and contains direct projections to the facial
nucleus (as recently demonstrated in monkeys; Morecraft et al.,
2004). Tasks that involve cognitive conflict elicit facial activity
(Schacht et al., 2009). And while positively and negatively valenced
words elicit subgenual cingulate cortex activity (Maddock et al.,
2003), repetition of emotional words produces a clear habituation
response (as reported in Maddock et al., 2003), suggesting that
novelty of the emotional stimulus might be important. Interest-
ingly non-verbal emotional stimuli (pictures of facial expressions)
do not activate subgenual cingulate cortex (e.g., Maddock, 1999),
perhaps because they convey affective meaning directly, whereas
emotional words involve a higher degree of semantic inference.
Next, how might somatic state representations constrain action
simulation during language comprehension? Given the strong
bidirectional connection between the anterior insula and infe-
rior frontal gyrus (IFG), which includes Broca’s region in humans
(Mesulam and Mufson, 1985; Augustine, 1996), we see at least two
possibilities. One is that they provide a modality-specific neural
substrate for the representation of emotion states described in lan-
guage, as predicted by other emotion simulation accounts (Havas
et al., 2007; Niedenthal, 2007). If so, then the same region of the
insula should be active during both language about emotion and
during real emotion. Accordingly, Jabbi et al. (2008) found that
a region of anterior insula (extending to inferior frontal opercu-
lum) became active when the same participants either felt disgust,
saw facial expressions of disgust, or read short passages describing
a disgusting situation. The functional overlap supports simula-
tion theories of social cognition in general, although interesting
differences between the three conditions were observed in the
connectivity findings. Reading passages about disgust uniquely
included Broca’s area in the left IFG.
A second possibility is that somatic state representations encode
autonomic constraints of the body that differentially affect the
simulation (and execution) of some actions over others, much as
autonomic constraints influence real actions. Thus, somatic state
representations would help resolve ambiguity in action simula-
tion. If so, then we would expect that current body states can
become rapidly incorporated into online language comprehension
processes. Indeed, behavioral evidence has shown that bodily con-
straints on action are incorporated within early stages of syntactic
ambiguity resolution (within 500 ms) during sentence compre-
hension (Chambers et al., 2004). The insula has a long-standing
role in language-related motor control (Dronkers, 1996). A neu-
rodegenerative disease that impacts both the insula and language
is progressive non-fluent aphasia (PNFA). Patients with (PNFA)
are selectively impaired in sentence comprehension, but spared
5If the predicted somatic state error is small, then a shift in the action controller
may not be necessary. For example, if the reader is already in a somatic state con-
gruent with the language, then comprehension processes are predicted to proceed
with facility in the absence of facial afference.
in single-word comprehension, and other non-linguistic cognitive
abilities (Peelle et al., 2008). Although a role of insular cortex in
resolving ambiguity during sentence comprehension has yet to be
explored systematically, extant data support such a role.
UNIQUE FEATURES OF THE THEORY
Although our account is speculative, it differs from other accounts
of emotion simulation in language and thus makes unique predic-
tions. Foremost, emotion influences language processing above
the lexical level. Rather than provide a common neural sub-
strate for emotion and language about emotion (e.g., Niedenthal,
2007), somatic state representations influence a simulation of
actions as driven by speech action controllers in Broca’s area.
This account remains congruent with embodied theories of lan-
guage comprehension because the outputs of action controllers
are predictions in modality-specific regions of the brain (Barsalou
et al., 2003; Pulvermuller, 2005), and because emotion state con-
strain a modality-specific simulation. Although the two accounts
of emotion simulation make differing predictions, we don’t believe
they are mutually exclusive, and are rather likely to operate in
tandem during online language comprehension.
The model offers an explanation for a range of empirical
observations on the interaction of emotion and language com-
prehension. For example, in the study of Havas et al. (2007), we
found an interaction of emotion and language comprehension:
body states of emotion (smiling, and frowning) that are congruent
with the emotional meaning implied in the sentence facilitate com-
prehension, whereas emotion states that are incongruent hinder it.
Consider reading one of the Angry sentences from that study,“After
the fight with the stubborn bigot, you slam the car door.” The neg-
ative emotional expression produced by holding the pen in the lips
activates associated negative state representations (angry or sad)
in somatosensory cortices, biasing the selection of effective actions
(e.g., aggressive,or defensive actions). Because the body is prepared
to produce the kind of actions that are required for understanding
the sentence, a simulation of the second half of the sentence (“you
slam the car door”) is completed with ease. By contrast, a positive
somatosensory representation produced by holding the pen in the
teeth would hinder the simulation of such actions.
This account also explains emotional interactions during lan-
guage comprehension when there is no pen to force a facial
expression. Here, simulating the action in the sentence produces
somatic prediction error, and generates an emotional response in
preparation for subsequent understanding. For example, the ini-
tial phrase in the sentence, “You slump in your chair when you
realize that all of the schools rejected you” will generate emo-
tional afference compatible with the initial decrease in wellbeing.
This is the result we found using EMG (reported in Havas et al.,
2010).
Finally, we can explain how blocking facial afference that is con-
gruent with the emotionality of a sentence might hinder compre-
hension. Despite any facial afference generated in processing the
angry and sad sentences, botox prevents negative facial feedback
from modulating central emotion circuits that would otherwise
constrain the simulation. But because happy expressions are unaf-
fected, they are free to modulate central circuits of emotion, and
constrain the simulation of happy sentences.
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By way of comparison with Glenberg and Gallese’s (2012) ABL
model, we too assume that the solution used in motor control for
deriving emotionally appropriate action was exploited through
evolution by language. For language, our theory works much like
the ABL model in that modules are grounded in actions and
sensory predictions, a gain control mechanism suppresses literal
execution, and controller output is tantamount to a simulation.
However, there are also several features that are new in our the-
ory. Foremost, selection of modules for running a simulation of
language is determined not just by motor prediction error, but
also by a somatic error signal. Thus, an extension of the ABL
model for emotional language comprehension would add a for-
ward model that learns to predict future somatic states that result
from actions. Action controllers for simulation are jointly deter-
mined by the operation of both types of predictor that work in
a complementary way to determine the relative goodness of par-
ticular actions. Where the predictors are uncertain, the reward
model can guide behavior, and vice versa. When effective actions
are underspecified in the language, emotion simulation will guide
the derivation of those actions. This feature may have implications
for comprehension of abstract concepts, and may explain why
concepts that bear on a person’s wellbeing but that don’t specify
particular action, like “freedom” or “justice,” are often emotionally
evocative.
Another difference between the ABL theory and ours is that
lower-level control structures are constrained by higher-level emo-
tion states. That is, global states of emotion (that correspond to
action tendencies of approach or withdrawal, for example) will
constrain the simulation of actions in a probabilistic fashion.
Because emotional facial expressions change action tendencies
through modulation of the ANS (Levenson, 1992), they predis-
pose the body for taking certain actions. For example, a posi-
tive emotion state will potentiate actions of approach (Davidson,
1992). If language understanding requires a simulation of simi-
lar such actions, then comprehension will have been facilitated.
Thus, because smiling will potentiate actions of approach and
affiliation, it is likely to facilitate a simulation of the actions in a
sentence like, “You lean over your birthday cake and blow out all
the candles.”
Finally, our account gives emotion a central role in language
comprehension, even for simulation of language that is only
implicitly emotional. We think this is fitting – language conveys
emotional meaning at every level of analysis, from prosody, to
morphology, to syntax (Majid, 2012), and a reader’s emotions
are engaged by language at the earliest stages of processing (Van
Berkum et al., 2009).
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Our purpose in this article is to provide a theoretical synthesis
of research from several domains, with an emphasis on recent,
and intriguing findings. By necessity, we have overlooked vast
areas of work that deserve consideration, and only mentioned
some work that deserves deeper consideration. Further refine-
ment of the theory will depend on a more careful accounting of
this work. For example, our theory bears a similarity to accounts
of facial expression recognition in which facial feedback pro-
vides a source of automatic, rapid, and unconscious constraints
on processing (e.g., Dimberg et al., 2000). Another important,
and fast-developing body of research that deserves greater atten-
tion surrounds the notion of “simulation.” Our focus on the
mechanisms of emotion simulation may have overlooked broader
developments in this area are likely to bear on the present theory.
Another limitation concerns our treatment of alternative
accounts for facial feedback effects. One important alternative rests
on changes in mood, and studies have demonstrated that facial
feedback can influence mood, and mood processes (e.g., Kleinke
et al., 1998; Duclos and Laird, 2001). While we have developed
our theory partly in an effort to account for evidence against this
hypothesis (see Havas et al., 2010), mood-based explanations will
need to be carefully considered in future empirical validation of
the theory.
Much of our theory derives from the internal models frame-
work, and its recent projection to language in the ABL model of
Glenberg and Gallese (2012). Although in its present form the
account is an advance in that it suggests how simulation in Broca’s
region may modulated by emotion systems, much work is needed
to establish the validity of the ABL theory, and to connect it with
emotional language comprehension. Although many details are
still to be worked out, we consider this a step toward specifying
interactions of emotion and language that have long interested
researchers, and whose existing empirical connection is currently
only tenuous.
We have claimed that our theory supports simulation-based
accounts of language comprehension (Glenberg and Kaschak,
2002; Barsalou et al., 2003; Pulvermuller, 2005) by providing a
mechanism by which emotion influences action controllers in
LIFG for driving the simulation of modality-specific actions and
perceptions (as described by Glenberg and Gallese, 2012). Our
account is embodied in that understanding language involves a
simulation of meaning in multimodal brain areas that correspond
to the referents in the language. Language results from the oper-
ation of controllers (which learn to derive actions from sensory
goals) and predictors (which learn to predict the sensory con-
sequences of those actions) in LIFG. Thus, understanding the
meaning of the word “clap” involves first deriving the speech mod-
ule (in Broca’s area) for uttering the word “clap” from the text, and
then generating sensory predictions of the actions (in pre-motor
and motor cortex) and the sounds (in auditory cortex) involved
in clapping. As generated by facial feedback, emotion states (in
the insula) constrain the selection of controllers and predictors to
facilitate simulation of the language content. Thus, simulation is
grounded in action, perception, and emotion.
Although LIFG is not always implicated in simulation the-
ories of language (but see Pulvermuller, 2005), we believe this
region is important for embodied theories for two reasons. First,
LIFG is critical in syntax, and any theory that fails to account for
this involvement is necessarily incomplete. Second, an important
challenge for embodied theories is to explain predication, or con-
ceptual combination into grammatically meaningful statements.
We believe that the present theory contributes to the grounding of
predication in action and emotion.
For future work, one promising feature of the model is that it
suggests a constraint on the creativity of the human conceptual
system. Recall that somatic prediction error signals the relative
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value of taking a particular action in a particular context, and can
be used for action selection. Specifically, the signal corresponds
to the predicted change in emotional state resulting from the
action, as represented in somatic cortices. This signal is likely to
be important in guiding the combination of concepts during lan-
guage comprehension. Glenberg and Robertson (2000) suggested
that conceptual combination is constrained by the affordances of
the objects described in noun-verb combinations. They presented
participants with sentences describing novel situations that ended
in one of three ways, and participants judged the sentences as sen-
sible or nonsense. For example, the phrase “Bill needed to paint
the top of the barn wall so he stood on his . . .” could be followed
either by “ladder,” “tractor,” or “hammer.” They found that sen-
tences ending with objects that afforded accomplishing the goal
but that were used in an unusual way (tractor) were judged as
sensible just as readily as sentences ending with objects that both
afforded the goal and were used in a typical way (ladder). Yet,
sentences ending with non-afforded and unusual objects (ham-
mer) were quickly judged as nonsense, despite the fact that the
word “hammer” was similar to the word “tractor” in many other
ways (both are strongly associated with the context, both are tools,
both are common words, etc.). Thus, they argued that concep-
tual combinations are constrained by whether the affordances
of objects in the language can be meshed in service of reaching
goals.
A benefit from our approach is that it helps to differentiate con-
ceptual combinations that may equally afford goal-obtainment,
but differ in the emotional value with which they do so. For
example, standing on a tractor may not be as expedient or safe
as standing on a ladder to paint the top of a barn. By contrast, the
somatic error signal helps to differentiate these options on the basis
of their value for the organism. Actions that afford success more
expediently (i.e., they deliver the reward of goal attainment more
directly, with greater certainty, or more quickly) will be understood
more readily, subject to the current emotional state of the reader.
Thus, the present model enriches Glenberg and Robertson’s (2000)
account without reverting to standard, amodal linguistic criteria
commonly used to explain semantic combination effects (word
frequency, animacy, typicality, etc.).
CONCLUSION
By selectively blocking muscle feedback, botulinum toxin-a
(botox) has allowed researchers a new opportunity to test the role
of the body in cognition. Recent experiments with emotional facial
feedback have shown that botox modulates emotion experience
and its neural centers, and selectively affects emotion-language
comprehension, thereby strongly supporting facial feedback the-
ories of emotion and embodied accounts of cognition.
Using a functional account of emotion, we explored impli-
cations of this research for a mechanistic understanding of the
body’s role in language, and proposed a role of bodily feedback
in providing context-sensitive constraints on language process-
ing. Paralleling the role of emotions in real-world behavior, our
account proposes that (1) facial expressions accompany sudden
shifts in wellbeing as described in language; (2) facial expressions
modulate emotion action systems during reading; and (3) emo-
tional action states prepare the reader for an effective simulation of
the ensuing language content. In language comprehension, mod-
ules in Broca’s area learn to predict the emotional consequences
of simulated actions, and prediction error leads to facial afference.
Facial feedback provides context-sensitive modulation of visceral
states, and these emotional state changes become represented in
somatosensory cortex. In turn, somatic representations constrain
simulation of actions and action inferences for deriving the mean-
ing of the language. By selectively blocking emotional feedback,
botox systematically affects the simulation value of actions and
perceptions described in the language. Our theoretical framework,
based on internal models, provides a detailed account that can
guide future research on the role of emotional feedback in lan-
guage processing, and on interactions of language and emotion.
It also highlights the bodily periphery as relevant to theories of
embodied cognition.
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